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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY, a corporation;
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CQ[dp ANY, a corporation; and
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
vs.
OGDEN CITY, a Body Corporate
and Politic under the Laws of the
State of Utah,
Defendant - Respondent

Case No.
12310

Appellants' Petition for Rehearing
and Brief in Support Thereof
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellants respectfully petition this Court for a rehearing in the above entitled case. This petition is based
upon the following grounds:
POINT

I.

THE COURT HAS BASED ITS DECISION UPON
AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW.
1

POINT

II.

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER PERTINENT UTAH AUTHORITIES.
POINT

III.

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER IN POINT
AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
POINT

IV.

THE AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON IN THE MAJORITY OPINION ARE NOT IN POINT AND DO
NOT JUSTIFY THE DECISION OF THE COURT.
WHEREFORE, Appellants pray that a rehearing be
granted, that the judgment of the lower court be reversed
and that Appellants be granted the relief prayed for in
their complaint.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
David E. Salisbury
Alan F. Mecham
Suite 300
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
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Brief in Support of Petition
for Rehearing
POINT

I.

THE COURT HAS BASED ITS DECISION UPON
AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW.
This case involves the constitutionality of a license
tax ordinance imposed by Ogden upon the appellants,
public utilities, in respect to their gross receipts. It is
appellants' position that such ordinance is unconstitutional as an impairment of their franchise contracts with
Ogden, which contracts provide that the sums paid under
such contracts are to be "in lieu" of license taxes imposed
in respect to their gross receipts.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions filed by
the court in the case chose to focus upon the issue of legislative authority as the only real issue of the case. The
question of legislative authority as seen by the court is
whether or not Ogden had the power, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969), to agree to the "in
lieu" provisions in the franchise contracts with the plaintiff.
The majority op1mon answers this question in the
negative while the dissenting opinion answers it in the
affirmative. Central to the majority opinion's negative
answer is the erroneous conclusion of law that only express (as opposed to implied) legislative authority is
sufficient to authorize a city to bind itself by utility
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franchise contract in respect to the level of city taxes to
be charged against a utility exercising franchise rights
under the contract.
An examination of the cases cited by the ma1or1ty
opinion and the following statement in such op1mon
leaves no doubt that such erroneous conclusion was indulged in by the court:
"We must first determine whether Ogden
City was expressly granted the right to enter into
the 'in lieu' provisions of the ordinances granting
to the plaintiffs franchises . . . . " (emphasis added).
This conclusion of law was made by the court in reliance, as pointed out in Point IV hereof, upon an invalid analogy to dissimilar cases and with apparent failure on the part of the Court, as pointed out in Points
II and III hereof, to consider cited authorities which indicate the error of such conclusion.
POINT

II.

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER PERTIN·
ENT UTAH AUTHORITIES.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969), provides in
pertinent part:
"[Cities] may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, . . . gas works, electric light
works, telephone lines or public transportation
systems, or authorize the construction, mainten·
ance and operation of the <;ame by others, .
"
Apparently because this provision does not "expressly" grant the right to cities to enter into franchise con·
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tracts with public utilities the majority op1mon of the
court in the case at bar even calls into question whether
or not Ogden had the power to bind itself to the franchise
contracts with the plaintiff utilities, let alone the power
to bind itself to the "in lieu" provisions contained in such
contracts. The majority opinion states:

7'3.,....,

"We f:mt no specific provision in the Constitution nor the statutes dealing with franchises, nor
have the parties herein called our attention to any
such provisions. The power of a city to grant the
franchises must emanate, if at all, from the provisions of Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953 . . . ."
(emphasis added).
On the contrary, this court has indicated that such
power emanates from article XII, § 8 of the Utah Constitution, a provision which grants cities the power to enter
into franchise contracts with public utilities even less
explicity or "expressly" than does Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-14 (Supp. 1969). Salt Lake City v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., 52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556 (1918); see also
Murray City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 56 Utah 437,
191 P. 421 (1920). Article XII, § 8 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
"No law shall be passed granting the right to
construct and operate a street railroad, telegraph,
telephone or electric light plant within any city
or incorporated town, without the consent of the
local auhorities who have control of the street or
highway proposed to be occupied for such purposes."
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More significantly, the court in Salt Lake City v.
Utah Light & Traction Co., supra, found implied in the
language of said constitutional provision the authority
in a city to bind itself (but not the state) to a term and
condition in a utility franchise contract fixing the rates
charged by the utility. A city's power to bargain and
bind itself by utility franchise contract in respect to the
level of city taxes to be charged against a utility when
the utility exercises its franchise rights is no less implied
by or incident to the language and policy of Utah Const.
art. XII, § 8 and Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969)
than is a city's power to enter into a franchise contract
and to thereby bind itself in respect to rates charged by a
public utility. See the discussion of Salt Lake City v. Utah
Light & Traction Co., supra, on pages 10 to 13 of the
Reply Brief of Appellants on file herein.
As pointed out by the dissenting opinion:
"That the powers of the city are strictly limited to those expressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted, and to those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, is
settled law in this state.;Lake City v. Sutter, 61
Utah 533, 216 P. 234."
Application of this rule to the case at bar would be
consistent with the extensive in point dictum in Salt Lake
City v. Utah Light & Ry., 45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 (1914)
discussed on pages 10 to 12 of the Brief of Appellants on
file herein.
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POINT

III.

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER IN POINT
AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
The only cases cited in any brief before the court
which could be said to be in point in every pertinent respect were not even mentioned by the court in its opinion. City of North Las Vegas v. Central Telephone Co.,
85 Nev. 620, 460 P.2d 835 (1969); City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 76 Mich. 421, 43 N.W. 447 (1889); Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 125 Mich. 673, 85 N.W. 96 (1901). The unanimous
decisions in these three Nevada and Michigan cases upheld the power of a municipality to limit by utility franchise contract the city license taxes payable by a public
utility when exercising its franchise rights. In none of said
cases was there any clearer statutory or constitutional
provisions evident from which such power could be found
than Utah Const. art XII, § 8 and Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-14 (Supp. 1969). See the discussion of these cases on
page 7 to 10 of the Reply Brief of Appellants on file here1n.

All three of these cases stand for the proposition that
a general legislative grant of power to cities, such as Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969), which authorizes
cities to grant franchise rights to public utilities, carries
with such grant, as incident thereto or implied therein,
the power to limit by a term and condition of the franchise contract the extent to which a city may tax a public
utility when the utility exercises its franchise rights.
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POINT

IV.

THE AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON IN THE MAJORITY OPINION ARE NOT IN POINT AND DO
NOT JUSTIFY THE DECISION OF THE COURT.
The authorities cited by the majority opinion are
simply not in point. Not even one of such authorities
deals with the power of a city to limit by utility franchise
contract the extent to which it can impose non ad valorem taxes against the utility.

Spoerl v. Township of Pennsauken, 14 N.J. 186, 101
A.2d 855 (1954) is the only case which involved the
power of a city to limit by contract its power to impose
taxes, and that authority is totally inapplicable to the case
at bar. The contract involved was not a utility franchise
contract and the tax involved was a property or special
assessment tax. As indicated on pages 14 and 15 of the
Reply Brief of Appellants, property tax authorities are
"sui generis" and have no application by way of analogy
or otherwise to the case at bar. Because of the special
requirements of uniformity and equality which exist in
connection with property taxes, statements in property
tax cases to the effect that a city must have an "express"
grant of power in order to be able to grant a property
tax exemption by contract, must be conceded to be correct. However, the reference in such statements to "by
contract" adds nothing whatsoever. It is elementary law
that property taxes must be levied uniformally and
equally upon all property, and exemptions may not be
granted by any means whatsoever, by contract or otherwise, without express constitutional or statutory authority.
8

38 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 387 (1941). The
"in lieu" provisions before the court in the case at bar
do not purport to apply to ad valorem property taxation.
St. Paul v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 78 Minn. 331, 81
N.W. 200 (1899) is inapplicable because it involved a
limitation by utility franchise contract of the police power
rather than the taxing power of a city. Dictum in that case
states that "a municipality cannot, at least without express
legislative authority, deprive itself by contract of any governmental power conferred upon it for public purposes."
81 N.W. at 201. When dealing with the police power, as
was this case, the phrase "at least without express legislative authority" adds nothing to such statement and, in
fact, gives the false impression that the city could alienate
its police power by contract if it were expressly authorized
'lature. Even
.
to d o so b y t h e 1eg1s
express" l
eg1slative authority, a city could have no greater power than
the legislature of which it is a creature, and the law is
clear that, unlike its taxing power, a legislature may not
by contract deprive itself
power. As was stated
at pages 31 to 33 of Annot., Tax Exemptions cmd the Contract Clame, 173 ALR 15 (1948):
" . . . [T]he courts have held, specifically
and repeatedly, that the police power and that of
eminent domain are inalienable, cannot be bargained or bartered away by the state .or subdivisions by contract, and generally speaking, are not
within the contemplation of the contract clause because contracts are made subject to the understanding and condition that such powers are not susceptible of elimination by contract and may be
exercised in the future. And for over one hundred
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years, although unsuccessfully, eminent members
of the bench of the Federal Supreme Court, lower
Federal courts, and various state courts, have
strenuously urged that since the taxing power is,
in essence, of the same nature as the police power
and that of eminent domain, it, too, is incapable of
being made the subject of a "contract" by one
legislature so as to bind the hands of future legislative bodies. . . .
"Although the force of these arguments has
frequently been admitted, . . . the doctrine [that
a contract of tax exemption can constitute a contract protected by the United States Constitution]
has withstood all the assaults made upon it for
over a century, and remains firmly established as
the law of the United States. The courts have repeatedly stated that the matter is settled, that the
question is not an open one, and that the Federal
Supreme Court, the final arbiter of constitutional
questions such as one as to whether there is a contract and whether it has been impaired, has foreclosed speculation."

Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1
(1898) also involved the question of a city's alienation
of its police power and therefore has no precedential
value, by analogy or otherwise, to the case at bar.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & L. Co. v. R. R. Comm'n.,
153 Wis. 592, 142 N.W. 491 ( 1913) is similar to the Utah
case of Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., supra.
The discussion of the latter case on pages 10 to 13 of the
Reply Brief of Appellants on file herein is equally applicable to the former case.
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Any suggestion in Elizabeth City v. Bank, 150 N.C.
407, 64 S.E. 189 0909) to the effect that a city can grant
franchises to public utilities only if it is authorized to do
so by express as opposed to implied statutory language is
not good law in Utah. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., supra; see also Murray City v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., supra.
The citation 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Franchises, § 7 ( 1968),
merely states a variety of reasons which may prevent an
alleged grantee of a claimed franchise from establishing
that his asserted grant constitutes a contract within the
purview of the obligation of contracts clauses of the state
and Federal Constitutions. None of such reasons, however,
apply in our case.
CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that Utah Const. art. XII, § 8
and Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969) are indicative of an intent on the part of the framers of the constitution and the legislature to place in cities the ultimate
control over the terms and conditions under which a
public utility may operate within such cities. When,
therefore, a city and a public utility are negotiating for a
contract granting certain franchise rights, it follows that
a city should, as an incident to its power to enter into such
franchise contract, be able to bargain and bind itself in
respect to the level of city taxes to be charged against the
public utility as a term and condition under which the
public
exercises such franchise rights.
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Appellants' three briefs filed with this court, and
their two briefs filed below conclusively show that Ogden
does have the power to so bargain and bind itself.
For as long as twenty (20) years in the case of one
of the appellants, the appellants have been paying two
per cent (2%) of their gross revenue to Ogden City expressly in consideration for the city's agreement that such
sums were in lieu of all non ad valorem taxation by the
city. If such agreement is invalid, the bargained for consideration has failed entirely, and appellants have received
nothing whatsoever in return for such payments. Perhaps if the majority opinion is correct, appellants are entitled to a refund of the franchise amounts heretofore paid.
Furthermore, since entering into the franchise
agreements with Ogden, the appellants have made heavy
investments and financial commitments in providing
Ogden City with utility services. This has all been done
under the good faith belief and expectation that the "in
lieu" provisions in the franchise contracts were valid and
binding. Can it be denied that such belief and expectation were justified in view of the authorities cited in each
of appellants briefs? It would be difficult to find a case
where adherence to established precedent would be more
important to effect justice than it is in this case.
The appellants, therefore, respectfully suggest that
this court should apply the established law set forth in
appellants' five briefs and reject its reliance upon an
invalid analogy to cases dissimilar to the case at bar.
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Accordingly, we respectfully submit that a rehearing
of this case should be granted.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY

David E. Salisbury
Alan F. Mecham
Suite 300
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Appellants
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